Abstract. Variational analysis provides an avenue for characterizing solution sets of deterministic Nash games over continuous-strategy sets. We examine whether similar statements, particularly pertaining to existence and uniqueness, may be made when player objectives are given by expectations. For instance, in deterministic regimes, a suitable coercivity condition associated with the gradient map is sufficient for the existence of a Nash equilibrium; in stochastic regimes, the application of this condition requires being able to analytically evaluate the expectation and its gradients. Our interest is in developing a framework that relies on the analysis of merely the integrands of the expectations; in the context of existence statement, we consider whether the satisfaction of a suitable coercivity condition in an almost-sure sense may lead to statements about the original stochastic Nash game. Notably, this condition also guarantees the existence of an equilibrium of the scenario-based Nash game. We consider a range of such statements for claiming the existence of stochastic Nash equilibria when payoff functions are both smooth and nonsmooth and when strategy sets are possibly coupled through a shared convex constraint. Notably the sufficiency conditions are less stringent, when one either imposes appropriate monotonicity requirements or requires that strategy sets be decoupled. Uniqueness, however, can be claimed by requiring that a strong monotonicity condition holds over a set of positive measure, rather than in an almost-sure sense. When strategy sets are coupled by shared convex expected-value constraints, a suitable regularity condition allows for claiming existence and uniqueness in the primal-dual space. We illustrate our approach by examining two extensions of stochastic Nash-Cournot games, of which the first allows for nonsmooth payoffs through the introduction of risk-measures, while the second allows for shared stochastic constraints.
1. Introduction. The theory of games has its origin in the work by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [43] , while the notion of the Nash equilibrium was introduced by Nash in 1950 [31] . While finite-strategy games form an important class of game-theoretic problems in their own right, in this paper we concentrate primarily on continuous-strategy noncooperative Nash games, where the problem data is uncertain and agents solve expected-value problems. Accordingly, the resulting class of games of interest are termed as stochastic Nash games. These games emerge in a host of applications ranging from electricity markets [23] , [24] , [39] to traffic equilibrium problems [53] and telecommunication networks [3] , where designers are interested in the equilibrium properties of imperfectly competitive systems.
Continuous-strategy Nash games may be analyzed through an examination of the variational conditions, specified compactly as finite-dimensional variational inequalities (cf. [17] ). Through such an avenue, a wealth of knowledge may be gained regarding the structural properties of solution sets of games, allowing for proving whether the set of equilibria is nonempty, a singleton, or even whether equilibria are locally unique. Most noncooperative systems arising in practice are characterized by uncertainty regarding problem data. For instance, in the design of power markets, both availability of power as well as the cost of generation is not known with complete certainty. A possible model for capturing strategic behavior is one where players solve stochastic optimization problems, differentiated from their deterministic counterparts by an expected-value objective. In many settings, the differentiability assumptions on the objectives cannot be expected to hold. For instance, standard Cournot models may require differentiability of price functions, a property that is clearly violated when price-caps are imposed [24] . Other instances where such a loss of differentiability may arise occur when players are risk-averse with nonsmooth risk-measures [42] , [37] or when they face congestion costs that are piecewise smooth [51] . In such regimes, the resulting variational inequalities have multivalued mappings and their stochastic generalizations are far more difficult to analyze. Finally, many application settings dictate a need to impose constraints that require satisfaction in an average or expected-value sense. An instance arises when firms compete in networked power markets where their bidding decisions may be constrained by a joint set of transmission constraints [39] , [49] . Accordingly, this paper is motivated by the need to characterize the solution sets of stochastic Nash games, particularly when such games are characterized by expected-value objectives, nonsmoothness, and stochastic constraints.
Before proceeding, we discuss where this work resides in the larger context of noncooperative games. The Nash solution concept in the context of noncooperative games was introduced in the 1950s [31] , [30] and presented the notion of one-shot games where all the players make decisions simultaneously, without the knowledge of the strategies of their competitors. A key assumption of the model proposed by Nash was that of complete information: the parameters of the noncooperative game are known to all the players. However, in practice, players may be unclear about their payoffs, leading to the notion of imperfect information. Harsanyi's seminal work [20] introduced the notion of a Bayesian Nash game and proved the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium. Importantly, the framework provided by Harsanyi requires the availability of a prior distribution on the parameters, not unlike the need for distributions when employing a stochastic programming framework for modeling optimization problems under uncertainty. An alternative approach lies in using a distribution-free framework that precludes the need for such a distribution; of note is the seminal work by Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] , in which a distribution-free robust optimization framework is developed for examining incomplete information games.
We consider a direction, inspired by stochastic programming models, that is more aligned with Harsanyi's framework, in which a prior distribution on uncertain parameters is assumed to be available. Consequently, under suitability convexity assumptions, equilibrium conditions of games with expected-value payoffs are given by variational inequalities. Recall that when strategy sets of the agents are merely closed and convex (and not bounded), characterizing the solution set of a continuous-strategy Nash game requires appropriate properties on the mapping constructed from the gradients of the player-specific payoff functions. A standard approach would focus on obtaining an analytical form of the expectation, which would then be examined further to obtain properties of the underlying variational problem. However, this may not prove sensible for several reasons: First, when the payoffs contain expectations, characterization statements rely on having access to a tractable integral of a nonlinear function, which is often unavailable. Second, if indeed one does obtain a characterization statement, such a notion is restricted to the chosen distribution and has limited generalizability. Third, if the player objectives are nonsmooth, then such an analysis is even harder to carry out.
Review of literature.
Before proceeding, we briefly review preceding work in the area of stochastic programming and games. The origins of stochastic programming can be traced to the work of Dantzig [13] and Beale [7] . This subfield of mathematical programming has now grown to include linear, nonlinear, and integer programming models (cf. [36] , [9] ). Yet, our interest lies in game-theoretic generalizations of stochastic programs, a less studied class of problems. Stochastic equilibrium problems appear to have been first investigated by Haurie, Zaccour, and Smeers [22] , [21] , where a twoperiod adapted open-loop model is presented.
The use of variational inequalities for capturing the Nash equilibrium has relevance when considering Nash games in which players are faced by continuous convex optimization problems (cf. [19] , [17] , [26] for an excellent survey of variational inequalities). Such approaches have allowed for deriving insights into strategic behavior in power markets [23] , [39] , wireless and wireline communication networks [3] , [52] , and cognitive radio networks [38] , among others. These efforts have ranged from developing precise statements of existence/uniqueness for particular models to developing distributed algorithms (see [17] , [26] , [16] , [27] ). In many settings, nonsmooth player objectives are an essential specification, arising from certain problem-specific intricacies, such as nonsmooth price functions [24] (such as through the imposition of price-caps) or through the use of nonsmooth risk-measures [42] , [37] . In this setting, Facchinei and Pang [16] provide a detailed discussion of how equilibria may be characterized. Multistage generalizations have been less used in the past with some exceptions; in particular, Shanbhag, Infanger, and Glynn [39] use a two-stage model to capture strategic behavior in twosettlement power markets, while Mookherjee et al. [29] consider dynamic oligopolistic competition using differential variational inequalities [32] .
In stochastic regimes, however, the efforts have been largely restricted to algorithmic schemes, a subset of these being matrix-splitting schemes [39] and approximation techniques [18] . Monte Carlo sampling approaches, often referred to as sample-average approximation (SAA) methods [40] , have proved useful in the solution of stochastic optimization problems [47] , [41] , [12] , [34] . Of note is the recent work by Xu and his coauthors on the solution of stochastic Nash games. More specifically, Xu and Zhang [48] , in what appears to be among the first papers to examine smooth and nonsmooth stochastic Nash games, demonstrate the convergence properties of SAA estimators to their true counterparts. A broader overview of such techniques in the context of stochastic generalized equations is provided by Xu [46] . More recently, Zhang, Xu, and Wu have examined related problems in the context of power markets [54] . However, variational approaches have been less useful in finite-strategy games where simulation-based schemes have assumed relevance (cf. [44] , [45] ).
Yet, far less is known about characterization of solutions when the uncertainty is defined by a continuous distribution. In particular, when players solve expected-value problems with general probability measures, little is known about whether equilibria exist and are unique, particularly when strategy sets are unbounded. On the basis of precisely such a shortcoming, we develop a framework for claiming existence of equilibria in both smooth and nonsmooth regimes.
1.2.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions.
(1) Smooth stochastic Nash games. Our first set of results, provided in section 3, is associated with stochastic Nash games where the random player objectives are differentiable. Specifically, by leveraging Lebesgue convergence theorems, we develop conditions under which the satisfaction of a coercivity condition associated with a scenario-based Nash game in an almost-sure sense allows us to claim that the stochastic Nash game admits an equilibrium. The associated coercivity requirements can be further weakened when the mappings are monotone or the strategy sets are uncoupled. In a similar vein, we show that if the gradient maps associated with a scenario-based Nash game are strongly monotone over a set of positive measure, then the stochastic Nash game admits a unique equilibrium. (2) Nonsmooth stochastic Nash games. When player payoffs are merely continuous, the variational conditions of scenario-based Nash games are given by multivalued variational inequalities. However, by utilizing a set-valued analog of Fatou's lemma, in section 4, we show that the existence relationship of (1) may be recovered for general and monotone gradient maps. (3) Stochastic Nash games with coupled stochastic constraints. Often a stochastic Nash game may be characterized by coupled stochastic constraints. We examine whether the equilibrium in primal variables and Lagrange multipliers (referred to as an equilibrium in the primal-dual space) may be characterized using the techniques from (1). Interestingly, we develop conditions in section 5 for claiming the existence and uniqueness of the stochastic Nash game in the primal-dual space. Note that, in general, even when a mapping is strongly monotone in the primal space, the mapping in the full space is at best monotone; consequently uniqueness in the whole space is by no means immediate. (4) Examples. In section 2, we motivate the questions of interest by using a class of stochastic Nash-Cournot games, where both nonsmoothness (a consequence of employing nonsmooth risk metrics) and shared stochastic constraints are introduced. We return to these examples in section 6, where existence statements are provided. We end the introduction with a roadmap to the rest of the paper. Motivating examples and some background to variational inequalities and nonsmooth analysis are provided in section 2. Smooth stochastic Nash games are considered in section 3, while nonsmooth generalizations are examined in section 4. Extensions to the regime with stochastic constraints are discussed in section 5. Our framework is applied to a class of risk-neutral and risk-averse stochastic Nash-Cournot games in section 6, and some concluding remarks are provided in section 7.
Notation. Finally, we review some commonly employed notation. Throughout the paper, a vector is assumed to be a column vector, and x T denotes the transpose of the vector x. Also x −i represents ðx j Þ j≠i and kxk ¼ P j jx j j denotes the 1-norm of a vector x. For any vector t, ðtÞ þ is used to denote maxðt; 0Þ. Let ∇g denote the vector ð∇ x 1 g T ; : : : ; ∇ x N g T Þ T and let ∇ ij f ðxÞ denote the jth component of ∇ x i f ðxÞ.
2.
Motivating examples and background.
Motivating examples.
A motivating problem for pursuing our research agenda is the stochastic Nash-Cournot game. In a Cournot model, profit-maximizing agents compete in quantity levels while faced with a price function associated with aggregate output. Deterministic Nash-Cournot games have been studied extensively [23] , [24] , [28] , [2] and have found applications in electricity markets [23] , [24] . However, stochastic generalizations of such games have not been as well studied.
We motivate our line of questioning from three examples, each of which introduces a complexity that is subsequently addressed. In section 6, we return to these examples with the intent of characterizing the solutions sets of equilibria arising in such settings. We begin with a stochastic generalization of a Nash-Cournot game. In such games, if at least one of the agents' production is uncapacitated, then existence is not immediately available from standard fixed-point arguments. Furthermore, the firms may be riskneutral, risk-averse, or may have to contend with expected-value constraints. This leads to three classes of stochastic Nash-Cournot games that our research addresses.
Consider N producers involved in production of a commodity. The quantity produced by firm i is denoted by x i with the column vector x ¼ ðx i Þ N i¼1 . Let c i ðx i ; ωÞ denote the random cost incurred by firm i in production of the commodity. Let p ¼ pðx; ωÞ denote the random price function associated with the good. In a stochastic NashCournot game, the players are profit-maximizing and the expected loss for firm i can be written as Ef i ðx; ωÞ, where f i ðx; ωÞ ≜ ðc i ðx i ; ωÞ − pðx; ωÞx i Þ. An expectationbased framework is inherently risk-neutral in that it does not impose higher cost on shortfall. This is the basis of the risk-neutral game which we define next. Throughout this paper, we consider a probability space P ≜ ðΩ; F ; PÞ and ξ∶Ω → R d a random vector. With a slight abuse of notation, we will use ω to denote ξðωÞ.
Example 1 (risk-neutral stochastic Nash-Cournot game). Consider an N -player stochastic Nash-Cournot game, in which the ith player decision variable x i is constrained to lie in a closed convex set K i ⊆ R þ that specifies production constraints and the ith player objective function is given by Ef i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ. Therefore, for i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, the ith agent solves the convex optimization problem
where f i ðx; ωÞ ¼ c i ðx i ; ωÞ − pðx; ωÞx i . ▯ The risk-neutrality assumption can be relaxed to allow for risk-averse firms. While a utility-based approach can be used for capturing risk-preferences, we extend the riskneutral stochastic Nash-Cournot framework to accommodate a conditional valueat-risk measure that captures the risk of lower profits.
Example 2 (risk-averse stochastic Nash-Cournot game). Consider an N -player stochastic Nash-Cournot game, akin to that described in Example 1, except that f i ðz; ωÞ ≜ r i ðx; ωÞ þ κ i ρ i ðx; m i ; ωÞ;
where κ i ∈ ½0; 1 is the player-specific risk-aversion parameter, z i ¼ ðx i ; m i Þ, and
Therefore, for i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, the ith agent solves the convex optimization problem Note that Eρ i ðz i ; z −i ; ωÞ is the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) measure at level τ i ∈ ½0; 1Þ associated with a player's expected loss and f i ðz; ωÞ is a sum of the expected loss of the firm i and its risk exposure. ▯ In many regimes, a firm may be faced by stochastic constraints. In this paper, we allow for expected-value constraints.
Example 3 (stochastic Nash-Cournot game with expected-value constraints). Consider an N -player stochastic Nash-Cournot game in which the ith agent solves the convex optimization problem minimize Ef i ðx; ωÞ subject to Ed i ðx; ωÞ ≤ 0;
where Ef i ðx; ωÞ may be based on either a risk-neutral or a risk-averse model and Ed i ðx; ωÞ ≤ 0 represents a set of constraints that need to be satisfied in an expectedvalue sense. ▯ In all of the above examples, if the probability space P is discrete, one can establish existence and uniqueness of the stochastic games by using standard results from the analysis of variational inequalities (cf. [16] ). However, when the probability space P is continuous, such an extension is difficult to employ since an analytic form is generally unavailable for the expectation. In such situations, we examine whether we can develop an avenue for claiming existence/uniqueness of the stochastic Nash equilibrium that relies on the satisfaction of a suitable requirement in an almost-sure sense. As a consequence, the need to integrate the expectation is obviated. Furthermore, we investigate whether these conditions may be extended to allow for nonsmoothness in the integrands of the expectations.
Background.
In this section, we provide a quick recap of several assumptions and concepts used throughout the paper.
2.2.1. Nash games and variational inequalities. Consider a game in which the ith player's decisions, denoted by x i , are no longer constrained to be in a fixed set K i but are allowed to depend on the strategies of the other players, namely x −i , as well. The resulting game is a generalization of the classical Nash game in that in addition to the interaction of players through their objective functions, it allows for interaction through coupled strategy sets. This game, referred to as a generalized Nash game, has received significant recent interest [14] , [16] . In this paper, we restrict our research to a particular class of generalized Nash games known as generalized Nash game with shared constraints and employ assumption (A1) throughout the paper, unless mentioned otherwise.
Assumption 1 (A1).
(a) P ≜ ðΩ; F ; PÞ denotes a nonatomic probability space and ξ∶Ω → R d is a random vector. (b) N ¼ f1; 2; : : : ; Ng denotes a set of players, n 1 ; : : : ; n N are positive integers, and n ≔ P N i¼1 n i . For each i ∈ N , the player-specific strategy set is denoted by K i ⊆ R n i , and the strategy tuple ðx i Þ N i¼1 is required to be feasible with respect to a constraint that couples strategy sets, denoted by C ⊆ R n . Unless otherwise specified, these sets are closed, convex, and have a nonempty interior. (c) In a Nash game with shared strategy sets, given x −i , the feasibility set of the ith player is denoted by the continuous convex-valued set-valued map K i ðx −i Þ, defined as 
These games require a set-valued map KðxÞ and a set K defined as
:2Þ DEFINITION 2.1 (generalized Nash game with shared constraints GðK; fÞ). Let (A1) hold and let the ith player decisions x i be constrained to lie in K i ðx −i Þ and the ith player objectives be f i ∶R n → R. Then the resulting game is a generalized Nash game with shared constraints and is denoted by GðK; fÞ, where K is given by (2.2) and f ¼ ðf i Þ N i¼1 . A tuple x Ã ∈ Kðx Ã Þ is a Nash equilibrium of the game GðK; fÞ if for every i ¼ 1; : : : ; N,
In other words, given x Ã −i , x Ã i is the global optimizer of player i's optimization problem
Note that if C ¼ R n , then the resulting game is just the classical Nash game. The game GðK; fÞ is said to be a smooth game if each player objective f i is continuously differentiable in x i , and the game is said to be a nonsmooth game if at least one player's objective is nonsmooth. In this paper, we are concerned with characterizing solution sets of the stochastic extension of the generalized Nash game with shared constraints GðK; fÞ. A singular exception to this arises when we consider general coupled constraints in section 5.
Given a pair of set-valued maps K and F, the generalized quasi-variational inequality (GQVI) [16] , denoted by GQVIðK; FÞ, is the problem of finding an x ∈ KðxÞ and u ∈ FðxÞ such that
If K is set-valued and F is a single or point-valued mapping F, then the GQVIðK; FÞ reduces to the quasi-variational inequality QVIðK; FÞ. Finally, when K is a constant map and F is single-valued, then GQVIðK; FÞ reduces to the variational inequality (VI), denoted by VIðK; FÞ. GQVIðK; FÞ represents the most general type of variational inequalities. The major area of applications of GQVI are mathematical and equilibrium programming. In [50] , a number of the applications of GQVIs are discussed, including minimization problems involving invex functions, generalized dual problems and saddle point problems, and equilibrium problems involving abstract economies. Next, we relate Nash games to variational inequalities [16] .
Smooth Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities. A standard approach for the analysis of Nash games in which agents have smooth objectives and continuous-strategy sets is through variational analysis. Under a smoothness assumption on f,
is a Nash equilibrium of the game GðK; fÞ if and only if x Ã is a solution of QVIðK; FÞ, where K is the set-valued mapping given by (2.2) and F ¼ ð∇
Also, from Proposition 12.4 of [16] , every solution of VIðK; FÞ with K given by (2.2) and F ¼ ð∇ x 1 f T 1 ; : : : ; ∇ x N f T N Þ T is termed a variational equilibrium (VE), a terminology that finds its origin in [14] . In other words, solutions of VIðK; FÞ capture a subset of Nash equilibria of the smooth game GðK; fÞ. The game may have other equilibria that are not captured by this variational inequality. The stochastic extension of smooth Nash games is explored in section 3. Throughout this paper, when the game has shared constraints, we focus primarily on VEs to avoid the challenge of contending with quasivariational inequalities.
Nonsmooth Nash games and GQVIs. For a nonsmooth Nash game GðK; fÞ,
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x Ã is a solution to GQVIðK; ∂FÞ, where the multifunction KðxÞ is given by (2.2) and the set-valued mapping ∂FðxÞ
where ∂ x i f i ðxÞ is the set of vectors w i ∈ R n i such that
It should be emphasized that ∂FðxÞ is not the Clarke generalized gradient of a function but is a set given by the cartesian product of the Clarke generalized gradients of the player payoffs. Again, from Proposition 12.4 of [16] , every solution of GVIðK; ∂FÞ with K given by (2.2) and ∂FðxÞ
Þ is a Nash equilibrium. In other words, solutions of GVIðK; ∂FÞ capture Nash equilibria of the nonsmooth game GðK; fÞ; the game may have other equilibria that are not captured by this generalized variational inequality. A stochastic extension of nonsmooth Nash games is explored in section 4.
Nonsmooth analysis.
For purposes of completeness, we recall definitions of several concepts used in examining nonsmooth games. While a variety of avenues exist for defining generalized gradients, we look to Rademacher's theorem that asserts that a locally Lipschitz function is differentiable almost everywhere in a Lebesgue sense. We use a form of the generalized gradient given in [11] as the following. DEFINITION 2.2 (Clarke generalized gradient).
where coð:Þ denotes the convex hull, Ω f is a set of points in Bðx; ϵÞ (an open ball of radius ϵ around x) at which f is not differentiable, and S is any other set of measure zero.
In this paper, we restrict our interest to player objectives that are regular, in the sense of Clarke [11] . Note that ∂ ij f ðxÞ denotes the jth component of the ∂ x i f ðxÞ. In defining a regular function, we define the generalized directional derivative of f when evaluated at x in a direction p as f°ðx; pÞ ≔ lim sup y→x;λ↓0 f ðy þ λpÞ − f ðyÞ λ :
DEFINITION 2.3 (regular function).
A function f is said to be regular at x if for all v, the directional derivative f 0 ðx; vÞ exists and is given by f 0 ðx; vÞ ¼ f°ðx; vÞ. In fact, if f is locally Lipschitz near x and convex, then f is regular at x (see Proposition 2.3.6 of [11] ).
Finally, we recall the notion of a monotone set-valued mapping from [17] . DEFINITION 2.4 (monotone set-valued map). A set-valued map ϕ∶K → R n is said to be monotone on K if ðx − yÞ T ðu − vÞ ≥ 0 for all x and y in K , and all u in ϕðxÞ and v in ϕðyÞ.
Risk-measures.
Suppose Y denotes the random losses, where P Y denotes its distribution function; i.e., P Y ðuÞ ≜ PfY ≤ ug. Then the value-at-risk (VaR) at the α level specifies the maximum loss with a confidence level α and is defined as
Its conditional variant, referred to as the CVaR, is the expected loss conditioned on the event that the loss exceeds the VaR level [35, Theorem 10] :
where ðtÞ þ ¼ maxft; 0g. Note that in (2.3), the least of the optimal m represents the VaR at the α-confidence level.
Smooth stochastic Nash games.
In this section, we analyze the stochastic extension of a smooth Nash game as described in section 2.2.1 and begin by defining a canonical smooth stochastic Nash game corresponding to the probability space P. DEFINITION 3.1 (stochastic Nash game). Let (A1) hold. A stochastic Nash game, denoted by GðK; f; PÞ, is an N -player game in which the ith player is faced with the stochastic optimization problem S i ðx −i Þ, defined as
where for i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, the strategy set
2) is said to be a stochastic Nash equilibrium for GðK; f; PÞ if, for i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, x Ã i solves the convex optimization problem S i ðx
Note that in the notation GðK; f; PÞ, K is given by (2.2) and f ≜ ðEf i Þ N i¼1 . Also note that by (A1), for each x, KðxÞ is a closed convex set and for each ω and x −i , the function f i is continuously differentiable and convex in x i . DEFINITION 3.2. (scenario-based Nash game). Consider a stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ. For a fixed ω ∈ Ω, the related scenario-based Nash game, denoted by GðK; f; ωÞ, is the game where the ith agent solves the deterministic game S i ðx −i ; ωÞ given by S i ðx −i ; ωÞ minimize f i ðx; ωÞ subject to
Then ðx Ã i Þ N i¼1 ∈ Kðx Ã Þ is said to be a scenario-based Nash equilibrium for GðK; f; ωÞ if, for i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, x Ã i solves the convex optimization problem S i ðx Ã −i ; ωÞ, or given x Ã −i and ω,
Note that in the notation GðK; f; ωÞ, K is given by (2.2) and f ≜ ðf i ð:; ωÞÞ N i¼1 . Our goal in this paper is to articulate properties associated with the scenario-based Nash games that allow us to claim existence of a stochastic Nash equilibrium. We do this by relating the games to corresponding variational inequalities and then using known results from the theory of variational inequalities to draw conclusions about the original stochastic Nash game. Our next result extended from [14] relates the equilibria of a stochastic Nash game and its scenario-based counterpart to the solutions of corresponding variational inequalities. With respect to GðK; f; PÞ and GðK; f; ωÞ, we define the functions F and Fð:; ωÞ as respectively: ð3:1Þ LEMMA 3.3 (variational equilibrium (VE)). Consider a stochastic Nash game given by GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1) holds. Then the following hold:
(a) If x Ã is a solution of V I ðK; FÞ, where K and F are given by (2.2) and (3.1), respectively, then x Ã is an equilibrium of GðK; f; PÞ. (b) Similarly, if x Ã is a solution of V I ðK; Fð:; ωÞÞ, where K and Fð:; ωÞ are given by (2.2) and (3.1), respectively, then x Ã is an equilibrium of the scenario-based game GðK; f; ωÞ. Proof. See the appendix.
▯ Lemma 3.3 shows that a VE provides an equilibrium to the game GðK; f; PÞ. Notably, the associated variational inequality VIðK; FÞ is a stochastic variational inequality (see [48] , [46] for more details on stochastic variational inequalities) in that the mapping FðxÞ has expectation-valued components. However, characterizing solution sets would require deriving properties of FðxÞ, a task that is significantly complicated by the presence of an expectation. Instead, our research is motivated by building an avenue for characterizing solution sets through the analysis of the scenario-based Nash game. As a consequence of Lemma 3.3, a solution of VIðK; Fð:; ωÞÞ provides an equilibrium to the scenario-based game GðK; f; ωÞ. Thus, characterizing solution sets requires deriving properties of Fð:; ωÞ, a deterministic mapping.
In section 3.1, we develop sufficient conditions for the existence of a stochastic Nash equilibrium, in cases where K is a general (possibly unbounded) strategy set, as well as when K can be represented as a cartesian product of (possibly unbounded) strategy sets. We examine similar questions in section 3.2, when addressing the uniqueness questions. Note that throughout, our analysis does not rely on the knowledge of the probability distribution P.
3.1. Existence of stochastic Nash equilibria. Our first set of results allows us to claim that under suitable conditions, the satisfaction of a suitable growth condition in an almost-sure sense allows us to claim that the original stochastic Nash game admits an equilibrium. This result relies on convergence theorems that allow for interchange of expectations and limits [8] and require the use of an additional assumption that is necessary for the application of Fatou's lemma.
Assumption 2 (A2). There exists an x ref ∈ K , and for each i there exists a nonnegative integrable function u i ðx; x ref ; ωÞ such that ∇ x i f i ðx; ωÞ
ωÞ. Before proving our main result, we provide a result necessary for carrying out the interchange between integration and differentiation as well as for allowing the use of Fatou's lemma. LEMMA 3.4 (interchange of integration and differentiation).
(1) Under (A1) (items (d), (e), and (f)) and (A2), we have
(2) Given a sequence fx k g ∈ K , Fatou's lemma can be applied for the sequence
leading to 
Through the form of F in (3.1), we get
By (A2) and from Lemma 3.4(1), we may interchange the order of integration and differentiation, obtaining 
where the last inequality follows from the given hypothesis.
▯ In settings where K is a cartesian product (for example, when C ¼ R n ), VIðK; FÞ is a partitioned VI as defined in [17, Chapter 3.5] ). Accordingly, Proposition 3.5 can be weakened so that even if the coercivity property holds for just one index ν ∈ f1; : : : ; Ng, an equilibrium to GðK; f; PÞ exists. PROPOSITION 3.6 (existence over cartesian strategy sets). Consider a stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1) and (A2) hold. Furthermore, C ¼ R n . If there exists an x ref ∈ K such that for every x ∈ K , there exists a ν ∈ f1; : : : ; Ng such that if the coercivity property is given by lim inf
in an almost-sure sense, then GðK; f; PÞ admits an equilibrium. Proof. For the given x ref ∈ K and for any x ∈ K , there exists a ν ∈ f1; : : : ; Ng such that lim inf
holds almost surely. Thus we obtain E lim inf
Applying Fatou's lemma, we get lim inf
This implies that C ≤ is bounded, where
From [17, Proposition 3.5.1], boundedness of C ≤ allows us to conclude that VIðK; FÞ is solvable. Thus, GðK; f; PÞ admits an equilibrium. ▯ We now present a weaker set of sufficient conditions for existence under the assumption that the mapping Fðx; ωÞ is a monotone mapping over K for almost every ω ∈ Ω. COROLLARY 3.7 (existence of a stochastic Nash equilibrium under monotonicity). Consider a stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1) and (A2) hold. Suppose Fðx; ωÞ is a continuous monotone mapping on K for almost every ω ∈ Ω. 3.2. Uniqueness of stochastic Nash equilibria. Next, we examine whether uniqueness statements may be available by examining scenario-based games. Recall that if Fðx; ωÞ is a monotone mapping in an almost-sure sense, then EFðx; ωÞ is also monotone. However, mere monotonicity on the set does not yield any immediate results as far as existence or uniqueness of the original stochastic Nash game are concerned. However, if in addition to almost-sure monotonicity, the mapping Fðx; ωÞ is assumed to be strongly monotone on a set of arbitrarily small but positive measures, then the stochastic Nash game not only admits a solution, but the solution is also unique. Before proceeding we define ϵ-strongly and ϵ-strictly monotone mappings DEFINITION 3.8 (ϵ-strongly (strictly) monotone mapping). The mapping Fðx; ωÞ of the scenario-based game is said to be an ϵ-strongly (strictly) monotone mapping if the following hold:
(i) It is monotone in an almost-sure sense on Ω.
(ii) Additionally, if there is a subset U ⊆ Ω with PðU Þ ≥ ϵ > 0 such that Fðx; ωÞ is strongly (strictly) monotone when ω ∈ U . PROPOSITION 3.9 (existence and uniqueness of stochastic Nash equilibrium for ϵ-strongly monotone mapping). Consider the stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1) holds. We further assume the mapping Fðx; ωÞ is an ϵ-strongly monotone mapping. Then GðK; f; PÞ admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Our result rests on showing that FðxÞ is strongly monotone map under the specified assumptions. On the set U ⊆ Ω, by strong monotonicity, there exists a constant c > 0 such that ðFðx; ωÞ − Fðy; ωÞÞ T ðx − yÞ ≥ ckx − yk 2 ∀ x; y ∈ K for almost every ω ∈ U : 
Therefore, FðxÞ is a strongly monotone map and GðK; f; PÞ admits a unique equilibrium [17, Theorem 2.3.3] . Note that (ii) follows in an analogous fashion. ▯ This result suggests that if we have a scenario-based game characterized by an ϵ-strongly monotone map, then the expected-value game does have a unique equilibrium. Notably, the former implies that the scenario-based Nash game admits a unique equilibrium with positive probability. Next, we examine the consequences of a weaker requirement on the scenario-based mapping. PROPOSITION 3.10 (uniqueness of stochastic Nash equilibrium). Consider the stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1) holds. Furthermore, suppose GðK; f; PÞ admits a Nash equilibrium. If we further assume the mapping Fðx; ωÞ is an ϵ-strictly monotone mapping, then the original stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Our result rests on showing that FðxÞ is strictly monotone map under the specified assumptions. This allows us to claim that at most one solution to VIðK; FðxÞÞ exists. Together with an assumption of existence, uniqueness follows readily. On the set U ⊆ Ω, by strict monotonicity, we have that Therefore, FðxÞ is a strictly monotone map. ▯ 4. Nonsmooth stochastic Nash games. A crucial restriction in the discussion in the earlier section pertains to the differentiability of the functions f i ∈ f. This ensures that the gradients are single-valued as opposed to being multivalued. Yet, in many settings complicated by nonsmooth cost and price functions, such as those arising from risk-measures or the imposition of price-caps, the need to examine nonsmooth generalizations of stochastic Nash games remains paramount.
We begin by defining the multivalued variational inequality that represents the equilibrium conditions of a nonsmooth stochastic Nash game. Throughout this section, we employ a modified form of (A1).
Assumption 3 (A1 † ). Define (A1 † ) to be (A1) except instead of (A1(d)), we assume the following: (A1d † ) For each ω ∈ Ω, the functions f i ðx; ωÞ∶R n × R d → R are convex and Lipschitz continuous in x i for each x −i ∈ Q j≠i K j ðx −j Þ. In contrast with section 3, in this section we concentrate on player-specific functions f ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ that are not necessarily smooth but are convex and Lipschitz everywhere, implying that they are regular.
Existence of nonsmooth stochastic Nash equilibrium.
In the same vein as before, our intent is to derive conditions under which the existence of an equilibrium to the nonsmooth stochastic Nash can be obtained from the almost-sure satisfaction of a coercivity result pertaining to the scenario-based nonsmooth Nash game. We begin by stating two existence results for nonsmooth Nash games, of which the former allows for convex shared constraints while the latter insists on cartesian strategy sets that preclude coupling. Akin to the results on smooth stochastic Nash games, our efforts rely on the analysis of the associated stochastic variational inequalities with multivalued mappings [48] , [46] . PROPOSITION 3) holds, then the set L < , defined in (4.1), is bounded. If L < is empty, it is trivially bounded. We proceed by a contradiction and assume that L < is nonempty and unbounded. Then there exists a sequence fx k g of elements belonging to L < such that kx k k goes to ∞. But from the definition of L < , we have that for each k, there exists a w k ∈ ∂Fðx k Þ such that Proof. The proof follows by noting that K ⊆ R n , a separable metric space, and by invoking Theorem 2.7.2 of [11] . ▯ One can therefore conclude that if w ∈ ∂FðxÞ implies that for all j ¼ 1; : : : ; n i and i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, w ij ∈ ∂ ij Ef i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ. It follows that w ij lies in E∂ ij f i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ or w ij ∈ E∂ ij f i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ. To obtain a precise relationship between the solvability of a scenario-based nonsmooth Nash game and its stochastic counterpart, we need to be able to express w in terms of the scenario-based generalized gradients. To facilitate this, we analyze the set-valued map E∂ ij f i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ further. This analysis requires some definitions. ]). Let ðΩ; F ; PÞ be a probability space. Consider a set-valued map H ∶Ω → R n . A measurable map h∶Ω → R n satisfying for all ω ∈ Ω, hðωÞ ∈ H ðωÞ is called a measurable selection of H .
As a consequence, for all ω ∈ Ω, j ¼ 1; : : : ; n i , and i ¼ 1; : : : ; N, the measurable map w ij ðx; ωÞ satisfying w ij ðx; ωÞ ∈ ∂ ij f i ðx; ωÞ is a measurable selection of ∂ ij f i ðx; ωÞ In fact, Aumann [6] defined the integral of a setvalued map using the set of all integrable selections; in particular if the set of all integrable selections of H ðωÞ is denoted by H and given by H ≜ ff ∈ L 1 ðΩ; F ; PÞ∶hðωÞ ∈ H ðωÞ for almost all ω ∈ Ωg; then the expectation of H ðωÞ is given by
If the images of H ðωÞ are convex, then this set-valued integral is convex [5, Definition 8.6.1]. In this paper, we are concerned with the integral of Clarke generalized gradients. Since the Clarke generalized gradient map has a convex image, the convexity of the set-valued integral in this case is immediate. Note that when the assumption of convexity of images of H does not hold, then the convexity of this integral follows from Theorem 8.6.3 of [5] , provided that the probability measure is nonatomic. Given the convexity of the set, we may define an extremal selection. A pointz of a convex set K is said to be extremal if there are no two points x; y ∈ K such that λx þ ð1 − λÞy ¼z for λ ∈ ð0; 1Þ and is denoted byz ∈ extðK Þ. Similarly, as per Definition 8.6.5 of [5], we say h ∈ H is an extremal selection of H if Z Ω hðωÞdP is an extremal point of
Then the set H e is the set of extremal selections and is defined as
Before proceeding to prove our main existence result of this section, we make an assumption pertaining to w ij ðx; 
We proceed by contradiction and assume that for any x ref ∈ K , we have that lim inf k→∞;x k ∈K;kx k k→∞ min
For a given x k , suppose we denote the selection that minimizes w T ðx k − x ref Þ by w k . By Proposition 7.1.4 of [17] , ∂Fðx k Þ is a closed and convex set, implying that w k ∈ ∂Fðx k Þ. Therefore, the following holds:
Note that the right-hand side of (4.7) is an integral of a set-valued map ∂f i ðx k ; ωÞ with range R n i and is a convex set. Thus by Carathéodory's theorem for convex sets, there exist λ i;l ðx k Þ ≥ 0 and y i;l ðx k Þ ∈ extð∫ Ω ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞdPÞ, such that By Theorem 8.6.3 of [5] , for each l, there exists an extremal selection g i;l ðx k ; ωÞ of ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ such that y i;l ðx k Þ ¼ ∫ Ω g i;l ðx k ; ωÞdP. Consequently, w k;i may be expressed as
Since g i;l ðx k ; ωÞ is a selection from ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ for each l, we have that for any ω ∈ Ω, g i;l ðx k ; ωÞ ∈ ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ. From the convexity of the set ∂f i ðx k ; ωÞ, we get that for each ω the convex combination P n i l¼0 λ i;l ðxÞg i;l ðx k ; ωÞ ∈ ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ. Therefore, we have that P n i l¼0 λ i;l ðx k Þg i;l ðx k ; ωÞ is also an integrable selection of ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ, which we denote by g i ðx k ; ωÞ or g i ðx k ; ωÞ ≜ X n i l¼0 λ i;l ðx k Þg i;l ðx k ; ωÞ ∈ ∂ x i f i ðx k ; ωÞ:
From (4.8) and by interchanging the order of integration and summation, the following holds:
Letting gðx k ; ωÞ ¼ ðg i ðx k ; ωÞÞ N i¼1 ∈ ∂Fðx k ; ωÞ, this expression may be rewritten as
By substituting the expression on the right into (4.6), we obtain that Consequently, the nonsmooth stochastic Nash game admits an equilibrium. ▯ Under an assumption of cartesian strategy sets, a corollary of the previous result is now provided without a proof. COROLLARY 4.6 (existence under cartesian strategy sets). Consider a stochastic Nash game GðK; f; PÞ and suppose (A1 † 
is contradicted. Consequently, the nonsmooth monotone stochastic Nash game admits an equilibrium. ▯ 5. Stochastic Nash games with shared stochastic constraints. Our general approach in the two preceding sections has been a largely primal one in that the equilibrium conditions in the primal space are analyzed. Often, there may be an interest in equilibria in the primal-dual space, allowing us to make statements about strategies as well as the associated Lagrange multipliers (prices) corresponding to the constraints. In this section, we assume that the shared constraint game is of the form specified by (A1), where the set C is given by C ≜ fx∶Ecðx; ωÞ ≥ 0g; ð5:1Þ and refer to it as G E . Our interest lies in the VE of G E . Recall that the VE in the primaldual space, under a suitable regularity condition, or constraint qualification (cf. [17] ), is given by the solution to a CPðR mþn þ ; HÞ defined as
where the mapping H ðzÞ takes on a form given by
. .
Note that we require that λ is a common multiplier for the shared constraint. In particular, we use a strict version of the Mangasarian-Fromovitiz constraint qualification [17] , which we define next. DEFINITION 5.1 (strict Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification). For a pair z ¼ ðx; λÞ that solves CPðR þ mþn ; HÞ, we may define an index set γ and β given by
Then the strict Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (SMFCQ) is said to hold at ðx; λÞ if (a) the gradients f∇Ec i ðx; ωÞg i∈γ are linearly independent; (b) there exists a vector v ∈ R n such that
Karamardian [25] showed the equivalence between the solutions of the variational inequality VIðK; FÞ and a complementarity problem CPðK; FÞ when K is a closed convex cone. Therefore, one may utilize the results from the earlier sections to analyze the The uniqueness of the equilibria associated with G is less easy to guarantee in the primal-dual space even if the associated mapping FðxÞ is strongly monotone. In particular, if FðxÞ is a strongly monotone map and cðxÞ is a set of concave constraints, then H ðx; λÞ is merely a monotone map over the entire space. Uniqueness, unfortunately, requires a stronger requirement in general. Next, we demonstrate that even in this constrained regime without strong monotonicity, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium in the primal-dual space under a suitable regularity condition. THEOREM 5.2 (existence and uniqueness in primal-dual space). Consider the Nash game given by G E . Suppose (A1) and (A2) hold and the SMFCQ holds at any solution of G E , and suppose H ðx; λ; ωÞ is monotone in an almost-sure sense. Furthermore, suppose Fðx; ωÞ is strictly monotone map for ω ∈ U ⊆ Ω, where PðU Þ ≥ ϵ > 0. Then G admits a unique Nash equilibrium in the primal-dual space.
Proof. We prove the result in two parts. First, we show that G E admits a nonempty compact set of equilibria in the primal-dual space. We proceed to show that any equilibrium to this game is necessarily locally unique, facilitating a global uniqueness result.
Existence. By noting that Fðx; ωÞ is monotone in an almost-sure sense, it follows that H ðx; ωÞ also satisfies a similar property, a consequence of observing that 
The concavity of c j ðx; ωÞ in x for j ¼ 1; : : : ; m allows one to claim that term (a), defined above, can be bounded from below by Fðx; ωÞ
By invoking Fatou's lemma, we have that lim inf
which is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stochastic Nash equilibrium in the primal-dual space. Uniqueness. A uniqueness statement in the presence of monotonicity of the mapping can be derived from showing that an equilibrium in the primal-dual space satisfies local uniqueness. Recall that local uniqueness of x over the set K follows if the only solution to the linear complementarity problem the latter a consequence of the concavity of c i ðx; ωÞ in an almost-sure sense. But by assumption, there exists a measurable set U ⊆ Ω over which Fðx; ωÞ is strictly monotone. It follows that
Therefore E∇Lðx; λ; ωÞ is positive definite and v ¼ 0 is the only solution of (5.4). This implies that x is a locally unique solution of VIðK; FÞ. By Proposition 3.3.12 of [17] , the tuple ðx; λÞ is a locally unique solution of VIðK × R þ m ; HÞ if MðxÞ is a singleton. But the latter holds from SMFCQ and by employing Proposition 3.2.1(a) of [17] . Finally, by Theorem 3.6.6 of [17] , if a complementarity problem with a P 0 mapping admits a locally unique solution, then the solution is globally unique. But CPðR þ mþn ; HÞ is a monotone complementarity problem, implying that H ∈ P 0 , and the required global uniqueness result holds. ▯ 6. Stochastic Nash-Cournot games and their extensions. In this section, our principal goal lies in applying the framework developed over the previous three sections. This requires ascertaining whether the almost-sure requirements can be expected to hold in practical settings. For this purpose, we consider two extensions to canonical stochastic Nash-Cournot games; the first is into the realm of nonsmoothness, while the second is in the regime of stochastic coupled constraints (see [10] , [23] for a discussion of Cournot games). In a risk-neutral Nash-Cournot game, firms make production decisions prior to the revelation of the uncertainty. In the first extension, we relax the risk-neutrality assumption by allowing firms to be risk-averse; this requires the use of a CVaR measure [42] . This measure belongs to the larger class of coherent risk-measures and has gained significant applicability in a variety of settings (see [42] , [33] , [4] , [35] for an introduction to the VaR, CVaR, and coherent risk-measures). Subsequently, we examine the regime with shared stochastic constraints.
Throughout this section, we consider a stochastic Nash-Cournot game in which the players make quantity bids, denoted by x 1 ; : : : ; x N . The players compete for profit that is given by the expected revenue less cost. In the standard Cournot framework, the ith player's revenue function is given by pðx; ωÞx i , where pðx; ωÞ is the random price function, while his cost function is denoted by c i ðx i Þ. In section 6.1, we examine a risk-averse stochastic Nash-Cournot framework to accommodate a CVaR measure that captures the risk of lower profits. Expectation-based shared constraints are introduced in section 6.2.
6.1. Risk-averse Nash-Cournot game. The earlier model is a risk-neutral framework that employs an expectation-based framework. This can be generalized to allow for risk preferences by using the CVaR measure that captures the risk of low profits. DEFINITION 6.1 (risk-averse Nash-Cournot game). Consider an N -player game in which the ith player has decison variable z i ¼ ðx i ; m i Þ, strategy set K i × R, and objective f i ðz; ωÞ ≜ r i ðx; ωÞ þ κ i ρ i ðz; ωÞ;
where Er i ðx; ωÞ ¼ c i ðx i Þ − Epðx; ωÞx i is the negative of the expected profits, κ i ∈ ½0; 1 is the player-specific risk-aversion parameter, and Eρ i ðz; ωÞ is the CVaR measure at level τ i ∈ ½0; 1 associated with player's expected loss. The player-specific risk is defined as Consider the objective function of the ith agent corresponding to a scenario ω for some ω ∈ Ω:
The nonsmoothness of the second term implies that the gradient map is multivalued in nature. However, the argument of the loss function is convex and Lipschitz (implying that it is regular in the Clarke sense). Since one of the summands within f i are continuously differentiable, it follows that ∂f i is given by
where ∇ z i ðc i ðx i Þ − pðx; ωÞx i Þ is given by c 
if c i ðx i Þ − pðx; ωÞx i − m i is positive, zero, and negative, respectively. Since, the function c i ðx i Þ − pðx; ωÞx i − m i is regular in the sense of Clarke (see [11] ), when c i ðx i Þ− pðx; ωÞx i − m i is zero, we have The variational inequality corresponding to the scenario-based game is denoted by VIðK × R N ; ∂Fðz; ωÞÞ, where
The term w T ðz − z ref Þ may be expressed as where aðωÞ and bðωÞ are positive in an almost-sure sense and integrable.
Assumption 6 (A4). Suppose that for large kx i k, c i ðx i Þ 0 ≥ aðωÞ in an almost-sure sense for all i ∈ N . PROPOSITION 6.2. Consider the game G NCR ðK; f; PÞ, where the ith player's objective is given by
for all i ∈ N . Suppose (A3) and (A4) hold. Then the game G NCR ðK; f; PÞ admits an equilibrium.
Proof. Recall from the definition of ∂Fðz; ωÞ, we have that if w ∈ ∂Fðz; ωÞ, then w is given by
where ðα i ; β i Þ for i ∈ N are specified by 8 < :
It follows that
It can be seen that for sufficiently large x, term (a) tends to infinity at a quadratic rate for α i ≥ 0. This follows by noting from (A4) that for sufficiently large x, we have c 0 i ðx i Þ ≥ aðωÞ for all i ∈ N in an almost-sure sense. Term (a) above can be bounded from below as follows:
where the first inequality follows from the nonnegativity of x i and bðωÞ (almost surely). From (A4), it follows that for sufficiently large kxk, we have c 0 i ðx i Þ − aðωÞ > 0 in an almost-sure sense. Since K i ⊆ R þ , we have that if x ∈ K, kxk → ∞, we have that term (a) tends to þ∞.
Term (b) can be written as κ i ð1 − 
Therefore β i ∈ ½0; 1, and we have term (b) tending to þ∞ or −∞, based on the value of β i . However, term (a) tends to þ∞ at a quadratic rate, giving us the required result. ) holds. The remainder of the proof proves that the latter is indeed the case. If w i is any element of ∂ z i f i ðz; ωÞ, then w i is given by
It follows that along any sequence
where ðα i ; β i Þ as given as above. Thus, for a fixed z ref , we have 
the integrability ofū i ðz; z ref i ; ωÞ follows from the integrability of aðωÞ and (A2 † ) holds. ▯ 6.2. Stochastic Nash-Cournot game with expected-value constraints. We now consider whether the framework developed earlier can be used for claiming existence of solution for stochastic Nash games with convex expected-value constraints. Consider the game with expected-value constraints, where the ith agent solves minimize Ef i ðx; ωÞ subject to Ed i ðx; ωÞ ≤ 0;
where f i ðx i ; x −i ; ωÞ ¼ c i ðx i Þ − pðx; ωÞx i , (A3) holds, and d i ∶R n × R d → R m i are convex constraints in x i , given x −i . Before proceeding, it is worth examining the possible avenues that can be taken.
Complementarity approach. One option lies in constructing an appropriate complementarity problem by assuming a regularity condition. Then, under suitable conditions, this problem can be seen to be solvable if a related scenario-based problem admits a solution in an almost-sure sense. This approach is described in section 5. If the constraints satisfy an additional requirement of shared constraints, even stronger statements are possible, as section 5 demonstrates.
Nonsmooth penalty approach. An alternate avenue that has not been considered here is an exact penalty approach introduced in [15] . Here, the coupled constraints are penalized via an exact penalty function. This leads to a nonsmooth Nash game whose existence is analyzed by leveraging the properties of the associated multivalued variational problem. Importantly, any equilibrium of the penalized game is an equilibrium of the original problem only if it satisfies an appropriate feasibility requirement.
We proceed to transform this problem into a nonsmooth Nash game and use the methodology developed in the previous section to claim existence of a solution to the penalized game. Consider the penalized game where each agent solves minimize Eðf i ðx; ωÞ þ ρd i ðx; ωÞ þ Þ subject to
This is a stochastic nonsmooth game. Again, in the same vein as before we analyze the properties of the scenario-based game to show existence of an equilibrium to the stochastic game. We require the following assumption on d i .
Assumption 7 (A5). For all i ∈ N , the constraint function d i ðx; ωÞ has bounded derivatives in an almost-sure sense. By (A3) and (A4), it can be seen that for sufficiently large x, term (a) tends to infinity at a quadratic rate. By (A5), the derivatives d 0 ij are bounded in an almost-sure sense. ) holds. The latter can be shown to hold in a fashion similar to Proposition 6.2, and we choose to omit this exercise for purposes of brevity. ▯ If this equilibrium additionally satisfies feasibility with respect to the penalized constraints, we may claim that the original game admits an equilibrium. PROPOSITION 6.4. Suppose (A3), (A4), and (A5) hold, and suppose for a ρ > 0, an equilibrium x Ã of the penalized stochastic Nash-Cournot game with expected-value constraints G NCE ρ ðK; f; PÞ is additionally feasible to the original stochastic Nash-Cournot game with expected-value constraints G NCE ðK; f; PÞ. Then x Ã is an equilibrium of G NCE ðK; f; PÞ. Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 of [15] . ▯ 7. Concluding remarks. We examine a class of stochastic Nash games where players are constrained by continuous-strategy sets with the overarching goal of characterizing the solution sets of the resulting games. Additionally, we allow for the coupling of strategy sets through possibly stochastic constraints and consider regimes where player payoff functions may be nonsmooth in nature. A corresponding analysis of solution sets of deterministic Nash games may be obtained through an examination of the sufficient equilibrium conditions. However, when the player objectives contain expectations, such an avenue is impeded by the generally intractable nature of the gradient maps. Instead, we consider whether almost-sure sufficiency conditions may be developed that are distinguished by their tractability and verifiability. Notably, these conditions, in turn, guarantee the existence of an equilibrium to a suitably defined scenario-based Nash game, whose equilibrium conditions are given by deterministic scalar variational inequality.
We begin by showing that when player payoffs are smooth, a satisfaction of a coercivity condition in an almost-sure sense allows one to claim the existence of an Nash equilibrium. A corresponding uniqueness relationship is somewhat weaker and follows if a strict monotonicity of the mapping holds with finite probability. Extending the existence results to the nonsmooth regime, while not immediate, is provided and leads to a set-valued coercivity condition that is required to hold in an almost-sure sense. In both smooth and nonsmooth regimes, monotonicity of the mappings allows one to claim existence under markedly weaker requirements. When strategy sets are coupled by stochastic shared constraints, the associated mappings are, at best, monotone in the primal-dual space, suggesting that uniqueness of equilibria may be difficult to guarantee. Yet, by employing a suitable regularity condition, we prove that an equilibrium in the primal-dual space exists and is unique.
The application of the sufficiency conditions is generally not always immediate and requires analyzing the associated scenario-based Nash games. We apply these conditions to the study of Nash-Cournot games in risk-averse and coupled constraint settings and derive a host of characterization statements in these regimes.
Appendix (Proof of Lemma 3.3). (a) Suppose x Ã ∈ K is a solution of VIðK; FÞ, where K and F are defined by (2.2) and (3.1), respectively. Then, given x Ã −i , it suffices to show that x Ã i is a minimizer of S i ðx Ã −i Þ. Also, x Ã ∈ K gives that x Ã ∈ Kðx Ã Þ, or that x Ã i ∈ K i ∩ Cðx Ã −i Þ. Consider a vector y i ∈ K i ∩ C i ðx Ã −i Þ and let y be defined as ðy j Þ N j¼1 , where y j ¼ x 
